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Onceharm has been done,
even afoolunderstands it.
Homer, TheIliad, BookXVII, 1.32
Editorial
Absence of Certainty Is Not
Synonymous with Absence of Risk
Bad things happen. Although human society has been remarkably suc-
cessful in developing techniques to preempt some bad events, the suc-
cesses have raised expectations. As we have devised ways of reducing
some risks, smaller risks seem more significant. Simultaneously, tech-
nological solutions to some problems have created new risks of their
own. The environmental risks that have resulted, both from growth in
human population and technologies, fall into two main categories: 1)
the possible consequences of misplaced wastes and 2) the wholesale
shift of land area from natural systems that produce many different
ecosystem services to human-managed systems which produce, at
most, one or two. The significance ofthese changes to human society
is the subject of much debate. The debate has, at times, become so
polarized that it is difficult to distinguish what is known from what is
supposed. The basic concepts of risk and uncertainty are keys to fol-
lowing this debate.
Every possible change or action has risks and benefits. Risks are
those consequences that human society finds undesirable, and benefits
are the desirable consequences. However, risks and benefits both have
three components: 1) how likely is it (probability)? 2) howgood or bad
is it and how large a spatial and temporal area does it affect (magni-
tude)? and 3) what is the quality ofthe information on which estimates
ofprobability and magnitude are based (uncertainty)? Uncertainty is a
component of both risks and benefits that results from imperfect
knowledge about the probability or magnitude ofthe consequences of
a change.
While high uncertainty may obscure both the probability ofa risk
and the magnitude of harm, uncertainty does not eliminate risk.
Unrecognized risks are still risks; uncertain risks are still risks; and
denied risks are still risks. For example, before the research ofPasteur,
Lister, and Koch in the late 1800s, the concept that germs could cause
disease was unrecognized. Surgeons routinely operated without wash-
ing their hands. The risk of dying from surgery was recognized and
weighed against possible benefits. However, many people died, and
others gave up possible benefits ofsurgery because the risk ofinfection
was unabated. Similarly, in the British Navy, it was observed that lime
juice reduced the incidence ofscurvy among the crews ofsailing ships
on long voyages (hence "limeys"). Even so, no move to put lime juice
on everyship was made for decades.
As we deal with potential risks to larger, more complex systems, the
uncertainty associated with estimates ofrisk becomes irreducibly larger.
How should we, as a society, respond to the increasing need to make
decisions about risks that carry high uncertainty? Choices that are rela-
tively easy when dealing with well-characterized linear systems become
more difficult as the problems become larger and the knowledge ofpre-
sent state, likely future behavior, and interconnections between the
many elements ofcomplex systems is limited. Two kinds ofmistakes in
this regard are possible: false positive errors and false negative errors. If
we act to ameliorate a risk that later proves invalid, we have made a false
positive error and have expended resources without any resulting bene-
fit. Ifwe choose not to act to ameliorate a riskthat later proves valid, we
have made a false negative error and forfeit simpler, more parsimonious,
and less wrenching solutions to risks
byfailing to act in a timely fashion. If
response time is even longer, expen-
sive remediation may be necessary or
resources may be lost for which there
is no possible replacement, including,
but not limited to, human life. As the
systems whose future is being pre-
dicted become larger and more com-
plex, the errors grow more cosdy.
Both science and ethics have
roles in environmental decision mak-
ing. In most risk assessment schemes, science and ethics come into play
sequentially. Ethical considerations define what society considers as a
problem requiring action. Science contributes probablistic statements
about the nature of the world, the connections between events, and
probabilities offuture happenings, but science does not tell us what we
should do. Ethics or societal consensus comes into play again in the
risk management phase as the relative importance of uncertainties,
risks, and benefits is weighed and a course of action is chosen. The
decision maker can make an educated guess about the future, but must
weigh the uncertainty of the prediction against the unpleasant conse-
quences should the decision be wrong. The uncertainty ofan estimate
ofrisk can be oflittle importance ifa decision is made to avoid the risk
because the magnitude ofharm is large but the resulting magnitude of
benefits is small. In addition, a large probability of a small adverse
effect in combination with widespread and large benefits might be
judged acceptable.
The appropriate degrees oftolerance for both risk and uncertainty
are important matters ofpublic debate, and these concepts are closely
interlinked. The uncertainties ofbenefits need to be scrutinized as well
as uncertainties of risks. Intolerance of uncertainty will guide choices
that require a higher tolerance ofrisk as actions are delayed and meth-
ods for abatement are limited by the progression ofimpact from early
to late stages. The absence of certainty is not synonymous with the
absence ofrisk.
In areas of great uncertainty, it is more difficult to distinguish
between ethical claims and scientific ones. The response to similar risks
and similar uncertainties varies depending on factors such as whether
the risk is consistent with our ethics, whether the risk is freely chosen
or imposed, and whether the associated benefit comes directly to us or
to society at large or to people other than those bearing the risk. Some
substantial risks, such as the risk ofinjury in a car accident, are accept-
ed willingly because the benefit is large and very direct. A similar risk
without such direct benefits may be begrudgingly accepted or rejected.
Ifan estimate ofrisk has high uncertainty and is inconsistent with our
beliefsystem, we maywell deny it, declaring the true picture to be lost
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Table 1. Examples ofthe varying qualities of information used to estimate risk
Scientific observations
Single
Results of one or more controlled and replicated studies
Observations of one or more natural systems
Multiple
Meta-analyses of multiple designed studies
Synoptic surveys of natural systems
Consilient
Observations showing that multiple lines of evidence are consistent and
can be connected with other phenomena
Educated guesses
Models used to link several well-studied processes together
Models used to extrapolate from studied conditionsto unstudied ones
Models used to extrapolate from one spatial, temporal, or hierarchical
scale to another
While most predictive models cannot be directly compared to observed
effects because they predictfuture behavior, often atscalesthat are
untestable, the most convincing models will be consensual (the state of
the art as determined in peer review) and will be based on observations of
relevant processes atthe highest possible level (9)
Speculation
Untested unifying principles
Models in which the component processes are not based, atthe highest
possible level, on observation
Hyperbole
Overstatement or catatrophizing ofinformation
Biased selective citation of information; anecdotal evidence when
meta-analyses are possible
Redefinition of keyterms
Hiding ormisrepresenting the uncertainty associated with information
in the uncertainty. Thus, a decision that seems to be based on empiri-
cal evidence to one person may, at the same time, appear to be based
on ethics to another because the first person judges the level ofuncer-
tainty associated with the scientific evidence to be acceptable, whereas
the second person judges it too high.
Uncertainty is a function of the extent and quality of knowledge
about a problem. The evidence used to estimate a risk can vary widely
in quality (Table 1). Shrader-Frechette (1) suggests that part of the
antiscience backlash recently described by several authors [see Ehrlich
and Ehrlich (2)] might be attributed to a failure ofscientists and deci-
sion makers to clearly distinguish observed effects from educated guess-
es, or from speculation. While society must learn some tolerance for
the irreducible uncertainty resulting from complexity, it should be
intolerant of uncertainty resulting from a simple failure to collect
information or from sloppy scientific technique or interpretation. The
costs for collecting this information should be borne by those who will
benefit from the action and not by those supporting a precautionary
stance. In our own self-interest, even small and uncertain probabilities
ofrisks oflarge magnitude or irreparable harm must be taken seriously.
The scientific method is not capable ofproving an action is "safe."
The best that can be offered is repeatedly finding no evidence of
adverse effects. And, in fact, when common statistical methods are
chosen that emphasize the control ofType I errors, the benefit of the
doubt falls toward the conclusion of no adverse effect (3). There will
be more false negatives (concluding no adverse effect when in fact
there is one) than false positives (concluding an adverse effect when in
fact there is none).
Quality and credibility ofscientific evidence can bejudged. Wilson
(4) lists five attributes ofrobust scientific evidence: 1) repeatability, 2)
economy (yielding the largest amount of information with the least
amount of effort), 3) mensuration, 4) heuristics, and 5) consilience
(the explanations of different phenomena most likely to survive are
those that can be connected and proved consistent with one another).
Shrader-Frechette (5) described a risk spectrum: at one end are cultural
relativists who believe that risks are only cultural constructs, and at the
other end are naive positivists who believe that risk assessment is com-
pletely objective, neutral, and value free. The cultural relativists under-
estimate or dismiss the scientific component of risk assessment. The
naive positivists underestimate or dismiss the ethical components.
However, those who simply deny the existence of risks may be an
important third group.
Denial (6) is still a common reaction to many potential environ-
mental risks such as global climate change, environmental endocrine
disruptors, and increased human population size and affluence.
Regrettably, denial ofrisk blocks the accumulation ofdata that would
improve estimates ofrisk and consequence.
Denial also polarizes public debate into "them" and "us" cate-
gories. This polarization serves as news entertainment but does not
advance the understanding ofcomplex issues. This obstacle is particu-
larly unfortunate because complex, multidimensional problems are not
as amenable to rapid resolution through reductionist scientific
approaches as previous problems have been. Instead, these problems
must be approached by using integrative scientific efforts on a scale
larger than in the past. Deniers can be subdivided into two overlapping
groups: those who believe there are no problems and those who believe
that any problems arising can be solved by human ingenuity.
Exemptualists [e.g., see Myers and Simon (7)] believe human creativi-
ty and technology exempt human society from risks that result from
the biophysical laws of nature. The related, but less sweeping, view is
that a technological solution can be found for every problem created
by technology (8). These views diminish the importance ofrisk assess-
ment in their belief that any and all risks can be abated successfully as
soon as they become bothersome enough.
In condusion, some ofthe risks that are mostvigorously denied (e.g.,
global warming, damage to the ozone layer, overpopulation) would, if
realized either singly or in combination, markedly reduce the prospects of
leaving a habitable planet. The tendency to discount risks that are tempo-
rally or spatially distant or those on larger temporal or spatial scales runs
counter to aspirations for sustainable use oftheplanet.
As stated previously, unrecognized risks are still risks; uncertain
risks are still risks; denied risks are still risks! The precautionary princi-
ple embodies the belief that it is prudent to attempt to diminish risks
with particularly severe consequences, even ifthe probability ofoccur-
rence is moderate or the uncertainty high. Excessive confidence in our
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